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ABSTRACT 
People with psychotic delusions have been mostly ignored 
when the freedom of belief and opinion is discussed. In this 
article, a view of freedom of belief and opinion based on the 
capabilities approach is presented, and I discuss what aspects 
are relevant and how these human rights can be promoted in 
cases of people with psychotic disorder. It is argued that 
although psychotic disorder may weaken many capabilities of 
thought and belief, it may also impart some meaningful abilities 
to the individual. Unbalanced power structures and nursing 
cultures that ignore existential considerations as well as 
stigmatization may weaken the person’s freedom of belief 
and opinion. However, this freedom can be promoted in 
psychiatric care through the arrangements needed for practi-
cing religion and discussing politics, issuing appropriate 
medication, helping in decision-making, individualistic care 
and service user involvement. Further, promoting participation 
in civil society and the community at large as well as coworking 
with religious and ideological communities may promote 
freedom of belief and opinion more widely in society. The 
challenges involved with the relationships between juridical 
and ethical rights in the capabilities approach are discussed at 
the end of the article. 
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Introduction: The freedom of belief and opinion—pressured 
between two opposite views 
The autonomy and freedom of people with psychotic disorder as well as 
ethical aspects of involuntary psychiatric treatment and other possible forms 
of force have been themes often discussed in ethics and philosophy of 
psychiatry as well as nursing sciences [1–3]. However, when it comes to the 
specific human rights of people with psychosis—namely, the freedom of belief 
and opinion1—the discussions have been relatively few. This is interesting, 
since the freedom of belief and opinion are human rights protected by 
international human rights conventions [4]. Moreover, the World Health 
CONTACT Mari Stenlund mari.stenlund@helsinki.fi Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 4, 
00014, Helsinki, Finland.  
© 2017 Mari Stenlund. Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in 



































Organization (WHO) and the ethical principles guiding psychiatric treatment 
ensure that these rights pertain to psychotic people as well [5, 6]. However, 
understanding what these rights actually protect is anything but clear in 
cases where people have psychotic beliefs and opinions (in other words, 
delusions). 
When the question has been whether a person with psychotic delusions is 
free to think and believe, and whether involuntary psychiatric treatment and 
the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication are justified, two opposite 
views have been presented. The so-called antipsychiatric view suggests that 
involuntary treatment and especially the use of involuntary antipsychotic 
medication violate patients’ human rights since the purpose of the treatment 
and the use of medication is to influence the beliefs of patients with psychosis 
[7, 8]. On the other hand, other debaters have claimed that psychosis is 
something external and alien to the individual, which has distorted his or her 
authentic beliefs and opinions. Thus, the purpose of involuntary treatment, 
medication included, is to liberate the person and return his or her freedom 
of belief and opinion (concerning these views, see, for example, [9, 10]). 
Interestingly, the human rights theory seems not to solve the question of 
how the freedom of belief and opinion should fundamentally be understood, 
taking into account that some people hold psychotic delusions. It seems that 
human rights theory ignores the deep conceptual questions that the case of 
psychotic individuals raises. Namely, if we take the human rights theory 
concerning freedom of belief and opinion literally, we probably should adopt 
the antipsychiatric view. The reason for this would be that, in human rights 
conventions and human rights theory, it has been claimed that the right to 
hold thoughts in one’s mind should not be restricted in any situation and 
for any reason. Moreover, it has been claimed that thoughts can be 
whatsoever, which seems to mean that delusions too, can be seen as thoughts 
that people have a right to hold in their minds [11]. 
This kind of approach to the delusions and involuntary treatment has not 
been adopted in mental health legislation and in the practice of psychiatry 
because the use of involuntary treatment and involuntary antipsychotic 
medication are allowed in certain situations. This is wise, since the antipsychiatric 
view seems to be ethically problematic. Moreover, I suppose that the conclusion 
of “a right to hold a delusion,” based on the literal interpretation of human 
rights theory, is a sign of ignorance within the theory itself: people with delusions 
have not been taken into account when the theory was developed. Thus, it is 
probably not meaningful to apply these kinds of conclusions to practice. 
However, the other view, which sees psychotic disorder as violating 
freedom of belief and opinion, is problematic as well. First, this kind of view 
is not recognized in juridical human rights discussion. Psychosis as a 
nonintentional nonsubject can violate human rights only in a certain meta-
phorical sense. Second, this view sees the person with psychosis as a victim 



































who should be liberated, which may lead to ignoring the agency of the 
person—the agency which should be viewed as crucial when discussing the 
right to freedom of belief and opinion. 
It seems that people with psychosis are actually left as outsiders and 
pressured between these two opposite views. If we adopt an antipsychiatric 
view, we may neglect the people’s right to treatment in an unethical way. 
People who resist psychiatric treatment would simply be “left with their 
delusions.” Is this really what we mean when we want to protect the freedom 
of belief and opinion? On the other hand, if we adopt the view which under-
stands psychiatric treatment as liberation, the right to freedom of belief and 
opinion blends into the right to be treated and means almost nothing. So, 
it seems that people with psychotic delusions are left unattended to when 
freedom of belief and opinion is discussed, even though these rights should 
also be their rights. This is why we need to develop the theory concerning 
freedom of belief and opinion in such a direction that it can be meaningful 
also as a right of people with psychotic delusions. What does it protect in 
situations where people have psychotic delusions and what kinds of action 
do these rights challenge in treatment and society? 
The purpose of the article and method 
In this article, I present a view of freedom of belief and opinion based on the 
capabilities approach and discuss what aspects are relevant and how these 
human rights can be promoted in cases of people with psychotic disorder. 
The article is based on research where material from different fields (for 
example, discussions concerning philosophy, ethics of psychiatry, human rights 
theory, political philosophy, and experiences of service users) were analyzed by 
philosophical conceptual analysis in order to realize interdisciplinary two-way 
interaction in human rights theory. 
The expression “two-way interaction” refers to Jonathan Glover’s idea that 
there must be a two-way interaction in ethics. Ethical principles guide practice, 
but practical dilemmas should also challenge one to develop principles as and 
when it is necessary. As Glover puts it, “ethical beliefs should also be revisable 
in the light of an empirical understanding of people and what they do” [12]. I 
suppose that the same idea can be applied to jurisprudence. The way in which 
human rights are understood must be tested, and rights should be redefined if 
we notice that they are not applicable in real life. 
I first present how the freedom of belief and opinion as a human right is 
understood from the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, and what seems 
to matter when the challenging situation of people with psychotic delusions is 
considered from the capabilities approach perspective. I then proceed to 
discuss how freedom of the belief and opinion of people with psychotic 
delusions can be promoted in psychiatric treatment in communities and 



































societies. At the end of the article, I consider the challenges of discussing 
human rights from the viewpoint of the capabilities approach. 
The freedom of belief and opinion from the capabilities approach 
perspective 
The capabilities approach, presented, for example, by Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen, is a view of human rights which emphasizes that freedom is 
based on different abilities and opportunities of the person. Sen argues that 
people are free when they are able to lead their lives in such a way that life 
is valuable to them [13]. According to Nussbaum, the capabilities approach 
is interested in what people are actually able to do and be and the real 
opportunities that are available to them [14]. Those who defend the capabilities 
approach emphasize that freedom in terms of capability is not the freedom to 
do something particular, but the freedom to choose. According to Nussbaum, 
options are freedoms [14]. Sen describes the idea as follows: “The focus of the 
capability approach is thus not just on what a person actually ends up doing, 
but also on what she is in fact able to do, whether or not she chooses to make 
use of that opportunity” [15]. 
Freedom in terms of capability can be divided into internal capabilities and 
external opportunities that affect each other. According to Nussbaum, internal 
capabilities are personality traits, intellectual and emotional capacities, states of 
bodily fitness and health, internalized learning, and skills of perception and 
movement. External opportunities or external conditions are, according to 
Nussbaum, social, political, and economic conditions which allow for a range 
of choices [14]. When it comes to freedom of belief and opinion, it might 
signify, in terms of capability, that the individual is capable of believing and 
thinking, choosing his or her convictions (at least in some sense), belonging to 
religious and ideological communities and living according to his or her views. 
The utility of the capabilities approach is that it takes into account the 
diversity and vulnerability of humanity. This is why the approach has been 
fruitful for understanding the human rights of people in poor countries 
and those in richer countries who have special needs [13, 16]. When human 
rights are defined, we need to do it in a way that is applicable to all members 
of humanity, not only those who already have several abilities and opportu-
nities for reaching their goals. Thus, the capabilities approach to human rights 
might have potential when the freedom of belief and opinion of people with 
psychosis is understood. 
Thinking and believing abilities, and people with psychosis 
When it comes to people with psychotic disorder, the challenge of freedom of 
belief and opinion is not primarily if they are allowed to hold and manifest 



































certain beliefs or not, or whether or not they are treated involuntarily. 
These questions are only secondary. Primarily, the interest is in believing 
and thinking abilities and in the capability to choose a way of life and 
communities to belong to. 
How psychotic disorder weakens thinking and believing abilities 
Psychotic disorder may weaken an individual’s internal capabilities to enjoy 
and exercise his or her freedom of belief and opinion in many ways. First, 
delusions may influence the ability to act in reality and engage in social 
relationships in a meaningful way. If a person’s view of reality does not 
correspond to the way other people see it, it may be difficult for that person 
to choose a way of life in which he or she has some value [17–19]. Psychosis 
may also influence the person’s social abilities if the person loses touch with 
other people who “no longer seem to be saying anything comprehensible or 
straightforward,” as Grant Gillet puts it [19]. Even though the person has 
some insight, delusions and hallucinations may be seen by the individual 
as temptations, which he or she tries to fight against, sometimes unsuccess-
fully. Gillet notes how voices that are usually “just in the background” and 
part of a person’s own controlled thinking, may sometimes “seem to have 
taken on a life of their own with urgent and desperately important messages 
to convey” [19]. A person may also feel powerless in relation to his or her 
hallucinations [20]. 
Second, in some cases, a person with psychotic disorder decides to carefully 
consider what to believe, and he or she may even refrain from creating 
ideas in order to avoid delusions. For example, when John Nash learned to 
discriminate and reject his paranoid ideas and attitudes, he rejected politically 
oriented thinking “as essentially a hopeless waste of intellectual effort” at the 
same time [21, 22]. A person with a past of religious activity and religiously 
oriented delusions may later think that religiosity does not suite him or 
her. Religion may seem like a drug which leads to the delusions.2 In this sense, 
psychosis may in some cases prevent the person from continuing with, 
adopting, or developing political, ideological, or religious ideas. 
Third, it has been noted that in many cases, psychosis may weaken indivi-
duals’ cognitive abilities, such as their reasoning abilities, insight into their 
own condition, and the ability to pay attention and concentrate [24, 25]. 
According to Lauri Kuosmanen [24], these cognitive impairments hamper 
the realization of basic human rights. However, Radden and Sadler [25] point 
out that these incapacities are rarely absolute and permanent. 
At least some psychotic disorders are associated with feeling powerless, 
which can be described as apathy, insensitivity, or “being like a vegetable, 
not a human being,” as one of the patients interviewed by Iso-Koivisto put 
it. As the patient described, “My feeling is that I have nothing or that I don’t 



































enjoy anything and I don’t have any zest for life. I just go from one place to 
another as if I was numb. It is not possible to read any newspapers or concen-
trate on anything. If you read, after a while you cannot remember what you 
read about”3 [23]. 
Gillett points out that psychosis can severely disrupt an essentially dynamic 
and interactive pattern of being, and the individual may face an impasse when 
“the world ahead is presided over by a demand and an expectation to meet it 
in some very limited way” [19]. Moreover, a person with psychotic depression 
completely lacks any energy, which Bolton and Banner [17] describe as a 
phenomenon “that spans the mind-body divide.” Moreover, he or she “feels 
despair and hopelessness, sees no point in getting up.” 
How might psychotic disorder increase internal capabilities? 
However, not all the consequences of psychosis are negative. Instead, in some 
cases, psychosis may feed certain internal capabilities of the individual. This 
does not mean that a person should be encouraged to experience psychosis, 
but it might mean that an approach that sees psychotic disorder only as 
something negative that has to be treated will not see other effects that 
psychosis may have on the individual’s life. 
Psychosis may be associated with a person becoming more aware of life and 
feeling that his or her life has more meaning. Sihtij Kapur [26] defines 
psychosis as a state of aberrant salience based on the idea that dopamine 
has a central role in the process whereby the psychotic individual considers 
some events and ideas in the external world as important. When Kapur 
describes the experiences of psychotic individuals, he seems to suggest that 
some patients become able to think about and understand the world in a 
new way. For example, some patients with schizophrenia have said, according 
to Kapur, that they developed greater awareness or that their brain “awoke,” 
that they noticed new things or that they could put the pieces of the puzzle 
together. Bill Fulford and Lubomira Radoilska [27] also discuss how psychotic 
experiences, though significant symptoms of mental disorders, may also be 
regarded as a basis for problem-solving capacity and positively life enhancing. 
Glenn Roberts [28] found that people who had lived with delusional beliefs 
for a long time discovered that their life was very meaningful. Even though 
their quality of life was weak measured objectively, Roberts found that they 
considered their life almost as worthwhile as Anglicans who were deeply 
committed to their Christian faith. According to Roberts, his results confirm 
the impression “that for some there may be satisfaction in psychosis and that 
the formation of delusions is adaptive, a creative achievement rather than 
affliction.” 
Psychosis may also be experienced as a positive crisis, which stimulates the 
person to realize how pointless his or her life has been. It is worth noting that 



































experiencing a psychotic disorder may change a person’s view about what is 
valuable, and thus, psychosis may influence the way the person would like to 
realize his or her capabilities. Eeva Iso-Koivisto [23] reports that it is possible 
that a psychotic experience might lead to the person seeing more options and 
even increased active agency. One patient interviewed by Iso-Koivisto [23] 
described her psychosis as a personal crisis in relation to all kinds of “smart 
systems,” institutions, and society in general. Psychosis led her to consider the 
meaning of existence. Before, she was unable to answer questions concerning 
this subject and felt that everything she did was meaningful. Through 
psychosis, she realized for the first time that not everything she used to do 
was meaningful. Grant Gillett [19] points out that for many people with 
mental disorder, “experiences of marginalization have caused a reevaluation 
of the values around which their lives are organized and that distances them 
from an all-in conception of reason-governed action in terms of the choices 
regarded by most as normal rather than pathological.” 
Stigmatization and unbalanced power structures as problems of the 
freedom of belief and opinion 
Psychosis has consequences for the person’s various social roles in treatment, 
different communities, and society in general. According to the WHO [5], 
people with mental problems suffer from different forms of discrimination 
and face difficulties in integrating into society. Ethical guidelines for 
psychiatry also refer to the idea that people with psychotic disorder are in a 
vulnerable position and therefore need special protection (see, for example, 
[6], Principle 1:3). The question of a psychotic person’s limited social engage-
ment is connected to the problem of stigmatization, which can be determined 
as something that reduces the psychotic person’s capabilities. It has been 
claimed that the stigma attached to mental illness has more influence on 
the patient’s future than the illness itself [16, 24]. These effects on the person’s 
social roles may also concern the freedom of belief and opinion. 
Problems in treatment 
It has been claimed that psychiatrists and mental institutions have a signifi-
cant amount of power over people who are vulnerable and in a weak position 
in society. Lauri Kuosmanen [24] argues that unbalanced power structures 
reduce the freedom of psychiatric patients. John Sadler [29] notes how the 
use of power often becomes a goal, and how patients are left without the 
possibility of defending themselves: “With the power of psychiatric diagnosis, 
patients/clients’ lives and lifestyles are at stake. Those who may be most 
vulnerable—the recipients of mental health services—often have the least 
direct input into a construct that will have a profound impact on them.” 



































Jennifer Radden and John Sadler [25] note that the arrangements in 
psychiatric practice give unchecked power to the professional practitioner 
(for example, private meetings where intimate details are considered). 
Even though there may not be direct coercion of a patient, the structures of 
psychiatric care may make the patient feel that he or she is being put under 
pressure or being ignored. Kaltiala-Heino et al. [9] note, for example, that 
lengthy negotiations concerning medication may feel coercive even though the 
patient finally “chooses” peroral medication. Marius Romme [30] criticizes 
any use of a diagnosis that alienates people from their own experiences about 
what is going on: “it makes them a passive victim of disease; it inhibits an 
individual’s existing capability and potential and so impedes recovery.” 
The problems of psychosurgical operations have been widely recognized 
from a human rights point of view. In this discussion the focus has been 
on the irreversibility of the treatment (see Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers [31], article 28:1–2). However, from the viewpoint of the capabilities 
approach, it seems that the focus should not be on the fact that the effect is 
permanent but on what the permanent effect is, namely does this permanent 
effect increase capabilities? From the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, 
we might think that the problem is not primarily that the beliefs or thoughts 
of a person are irreversibly influenced by a surgery, but instead, that there is 
a risk of destroying the person’s ability to be a thinking, believing, and 
competent individual. 
Some effects of antipsychotic medication can also be problematic from the 
viewpoint of freedom of belief and opinion. Sihtij Kapur [26] seems to think 
that antipsychotic medication may reduce the individual’s motivation, desires, 
and pleasures: 
“A high salience of the objects and ideas that one loves and desires is the 
important force that drives humans and their social interactions. It is quite con-
ceivable that the same mechanism (i.e., dampened salience) that takes the fire 
out of the symptoms also dampens the drives of life’s normal motivations, 
desires, and pleasures. Obviously, the effects are not symmetrical, i.e., drugs 
do not dampen normal saliences to the same degree they dampen aberrant sal-
iences, yet I know of no drugs that selectively and exclusively affect one and not 
the other in animals.” Marius Romme and Sandra Escher [20] have pointed out 
that if the role of antipsychotic medication is overemphasized, the patient may 
become psychologically dependent on it. Even though medication may be 
necessary in many cases, patients should be encouraged to find more perma-
nent ways of dealing with their disorder. They might develop a stronger agency 
in relation to their disorder and thus deal with it that way. 
It seems that stigmatization may lead to the existential needs of people with 
psychosis being ignored. Wagner and King [32] noted that people with 
psychotic disorder considered existential questions as the most important 
themes when their needs were the topic of discussion. However, carers 



































(including both formal carers such as mental health workers and informal 
such as family members) often regarded such questions as symptoms of the 
disorder or as the results of failures, for example, with the medication. They 
also emphasized the need for health, housing, leisure, and work, and con-
sidered existential issues as being secondary. In these cases, the diagnosis 
might be seen as a label that influences how carers understand the existential 
considerations of patients. Since having existential considerations is central to 
humanity, one might even ask whether people with psychosis are not seen as 
being fully human when their existential considerations are ignored, even 
though they themselves value them. 
An interesting question from the viewpoint of the freedom of belief and 
opinion is the rules that forbid public discussions concerning religion and 
politics in mental health facilities and advise discussing such matters only 
in a private area and only with certain people. Even though the purpose of 
these rules might be to protect patients and create a peaceful atmosphere to 
assist recovery and to avoid conflicts between patients, the question remains 
whether patients’ needs are also being ignored in the area of freedom of belief 
and opinion. If discussions concerning religion and politics happen in a 
private area, this is problematic from the viewpoint of affiliation, expression, 
and the ability to voice one’s opinions through dialog, which can be seen as 
important capabilities in society that the person might develop in mental 
health facilities. 
Problems in relationships, communities, and society 
The marginalization and stigmatization of people with psychotic disorder may 
weaken their integration into society [33]. For example, people with mental 
health problems are slightly less likely to vote in elections than those with 
good mental health [34]. However, Chan and Chiu [35] observed the political 
activity of mental health service users in Hong Kong and noted that they were 
more likely involved in protest actions and had higher levels of political 
efficacy. However, according to Chan and Chiu, this activity did not appear 
to produce significantly higher electoral participation or a stronger sense of 
citizenship, as these aspects were still lower in the group of mental health 
service users. 
Concerning private and family life, there may be a risk of the person with 
psychosis becoming more dependent on other family members. One might 
ask to what extent should a person with psychotic disorder take other people’s 
wishes into account when he or she makes choices, especially if the person is 
not able to live independently. In some cases, the person with psychotic 
disorder may follow the opinions and beliefs of family members without 
fully considering them. (On equal power relations, see, for example, Fulford 
et al. [36], pp. 480, 554.) 



































It has been suggested that some people are more vulnerable than 
others, and that people with problems are more easily influenced by others. 
According to Radden and Sadler [25] people with psychotic disorder are often 
temporarily and partially deprived of the capabilities required to defend 
against exploitation. Their judgement in matters concerning their immediate 
and long-term self-interest, their capacity to communicate their concerns and 
needs to others, and their perceptions of other people’s responses may be 
relatively weak. From the viewpoint of capabilities, the power relations in 
ideological and religious communities is a difficult challenge, since in order 
to realize one’s freedom of belief and opinion, one often needs to belong to 
some community where, for example, one can practice religion or politics; 
but some communities also may exploit their vulnerable members [37]. For 
example, if an individual with manic disorder wants to donate a large amount 
of money to a religious community, political party, or ideological group, the 
nursing staff has to consider whether to prevent this or not. They also have to 
consider whether this is a sign that the person is being exploited, or whether it 
is something the psychotic individual wants to do as a way of participating in 
some community. From the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, the central 
question in evaluating this might be to consider how the donation of this 
money will influence the psychotic individual’s options to later in life. If 
the person donates so much that his or her options are significantly restricted, 
preventing him or her from donating the money might be necessary in order 
to protect the person’s capabilities. 
When it comes to social roles in ideological and religious communities, 
there may also be a tendency “not to take so seriously” the opinions and 
experiences of people with psychotic disorder. Even though the community 
may tolerate such a person, there may be a long way to go until he or she 
is taken seriously and supported in his or her choices (for experiences in 
religious communities, see Wachter [38]). It is likely that a person with 
psychotic disorder may easily become stuck in the role of a psychotic person 
in the community, which may prevent the person from adopting other roles. 
One aspect of stigmatization has been the undesirable effects of antipsychotic 
medication, which have been socially disabling [39]. If a person with psychotic 
disorder is displaced from social life and society by stigmatization, developing 
new ideas together with others, and having some influence in society and in 
social life may turn out to be impossible. 
The deficient understanding of religious, political, and ideological 
questions in psychiatric treatment might relate to these wider challenges 
in communities and society. The question arises whether the attitudes of 
mental health workers might even discourage people with psychotic 
disorder from being politically, religiously, or ideologically active. If such 
discouragement is present, is being active ideologically seen as a threat to 
the person’s mental health and recovery? Or are society and communities 



































also protected from “psychotic activity,” since patients who are in a passive 
role may be more easily tolerated in communities? Moreover, the question 
arises of whether ignorance of ideological themes of discussion and discour-
agement, if they occur, may lead to patients looking for help concerning 
religious and ideological issues in places and from people who may harm 
them. 
Promoting believing and thinking capabilities in psychiatric 
treatment 
From the viewpoint of freedom of belief and opinion in terms of capability, a 
challenge exists to develop treatments that support the patient’s believing and 
thinking capabilities, as well as to realize a way of life that he or she values. 
According to Nussbaum [16], good care that takes into account the particular 
needs of each individual, providing stimulation for the senses, imagination, 
and thought, constitutes a valuable form of attachment, encourages social 
and political affiliations, supports control over one’s political environment, 
promotes the capacity to engage in practical reasoning, make choices, and 
protects the patient’s self-respect. 
Religion and politics during hospitalization 
When it comes to the ethical principles guiding psychiatric treatment, the MI 
Principles [6] recognize that the patient has a right to treatment, which is 
suitable given his or her cultural background, and that the environment 
and living conditions in a mental health facility should be as close as possible 
to those found in normal life.4 The Explanatory Memorandum to the RCE 
[31] points out that the catering arrangements for a psychiatric facility should 
take patients’ beliefs into account.5 However, with respect to ethical princi-
ples, no special attention is given to the opportunity to practice one’s religion 
or participate in political activities during treatment. It is not even mentioned 
that during elections, an individual’s right to vote should be protected or that 
voting facilities should be arranged in mental health units. It seems that a 
psychotic individual’s opportunities to exercise his or her freedom of belief 
and opinion by voting and practicing his or her religion have not been 
considered to be as important as his or her opportunities to engage in leisure 
activities, education, consumption, and work. In this regard, there are also 
other opportunities that the nursing staff together with religious and ideologi-
cal helpers could arrange for patients during hospitalization. For example, 
prayer rooms could be built, discussion groups could be held, masses and 
services could be organized, literature could be purchased for a hospital’s 
library, movies could be shown, access to the internet could be arranged as 
could education, just to mention a few examples. 




































Appropriate medication increases patients’ ability to choose a way of life they 
value. From the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, freedom of belief and 
opinion obliges actors responsible for the development of new medications to 
develop better treatments, which would be effective in promoting abilities that 
the psychotic disorder has weakened with as little risk and with as few unde-
sirable side effects as possible. Antipsychotic medication can be considered as 
first aid, given in an emergency, which increases the chances of recovery, and 
improves any cognitive deficits connected, for example, to schizophrenia, and 
may make it easier for a person to give up his or her delusions [40, 38, 25]. 
Sihtij Kapur [26] claims that antipsychotics provide a platform for the psycho-
logical and cognitive process whereby an individual can work through his or 
her delusions and hallucinations. Kapur supposes that this psychological and 
cognitive process follows similar stages in any case where the individual gives 
up cherished beliefs or overcomes fears. According to Kapur, “it may involve 
processes of extinction, encapsulation, and belief transformation.” 
However, Iso-Koivisto [23] notes that for some patients, the possibility of 
coming off their medication or controlling the dosage themselves signifies 
subjectivity and agency. Thus, from the viewpoint of capabilities, it seems 
important that the patient knows that he or she is not forced to use 
medication but that it is something that the patient can consent to. Moreover, 
psychiatric treatment should not be based on medication in an unbalanced 
way. Even if medication promotes capabilities, it does so only in part. Accord-
ing to Romme and Escher [20], it is important that patients with psychosis 
learn to talk about their experiences and deal with them so that they become 
leaders of their lives. They claim that this ability is supported by putting 
psychotic experiences into the context of people’s life problems, and treating 
their personal philosophy with interest and respect. 
Shared self-determination 
It is also important to note that a psychotic person may need help in making 
decisions. From the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, it is not necessarily 
a threat to a patient’s freedom of belief and opinion if decisions are made 
together. People are seen as fundamentally social, and even dependent on 
others. Patients interviewed in Maritta Välimäki’s study [41] reported that 
making decisions together was an important aspect of their self-determi-
nation. However, Nussbaum [16] emphasizes that in cases where a person 
is dependent on others, the person’s opportunities to choose should be sup-
ported. Also, Kuosmanen [24] states that it is important that the patient’s 
capability for choice is supported as much as possible “even in ostensibly 
minor matters.” 



































The idea of shared self-determination can also be recognized in the 
definition of autonomy presented by Widdershoven and Abma [42] when 
they define autonomy as moral development, which, in turn, is dialogical 
and practical learning. If autonomy is understood in this sense, it is crucial 
that a patient is able to reflect on his or her values and find a way to practically 
deal with his or her situation. However, the patient may need help “to develop 
a new and better understanding of his situation and a more adequate way of 
dealing with it,” as Widdershoven and Abma [42] express it. 
The consumer model and individualized care 
The capabilities approach focuses on the individual’s opportunity to choose 
and his/her ability to realize goals. Thus, it seems that the consumer model 
and individualized care in psychiatric treatment are also relevant topics when 
discussing the psychotic individual’s freedom of belief and opinion. 
In the consumer model, people with psychosis are seen as consumers of 
mental health services who are invited to give feedback and express their 
opinions concerning these services. Mental health practitioners are seen as 
advisers, coaches, or collaborators who assist the person to achieve his or 
her self-defined life goals [43]. Radden and Sadler [25] note that the consumer 
model can be applied only partly in cases where patients suffer from 
psychosis, because they may be temporarily or partially deprived “of the very 
capabilities required for an exercise of autonomy.” However, Radden and 
Sadler [25] note that patients’ capabilities have too often been underestimated. 
According to them, one should recognize that people with psychotic disorders 
probably become autonomous consumers at some point in their treatment. 
Moreover, one might ask whether a patient should have more options even 
if he or she has been sent for involuntary treatment. For example, could a 
patient choose the psychiatrist who treats him or her?6 If this kind of signi-
ficant power were to be given to patients who are sent for involuntary treat-
ment, would it make the treatment more successful, would it reduce the 
chances of them feeling humiliated, and would it increase their self-respect? 
For example, if patients were worried about how their religious beliefs or 
ideological thoughts would be considered during treatment, they could choose 
a psychiatrist whom they could trust and feel safe discussing this issue with. 
Even though the consumer model seems to provide more options to people 
with psychosis, the need for deeper service user involvement in psychiatry has 
been recognized. Instead of seeing patients consuming services, which some-
body else has planned for them, they could also have the power to decide what 
the content of these services should be. Hickey and Kipping [43] call this 
deeper involvement the democratization approach. Moreover, patients could 
have more opportunities to speak out for themselves when different psychi-
atric definitions are given and when further mental health research is done. 



































Maritta Välimäki [41] describes how some patients were delighted when 
asked about their views on self-determination, and said that it was the first 
time that someone had shown an interest in what they thought. Välimäki also 
notes that many patients were capable of offering important insights into the 
concepts and definitions that are used in mental health nursing. 
Nussbaum [16] points out that the important idea behind individualization 
is that people are not (stigmatized) “types” but rather individuals.7 Peele and 
Chodoff [44] note that general statements about what “the mentally ill need” 
are suspect because the mentally ill “comprise such a heterogeneous group.” 
Fulford, Thornton, and Graham [36] argue that different patients have differ-
ent values. Mental health service users are not a homogeneous group with 
similar values. They are all individuals with values of their own. 
However, from the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, individualized 
care does not mean that the treatment offered must be in line with the 
individual’s wishes. The focus of individualized care is not on fulfilling the 
individual’s dreams but on his or her agency (compare with [44]). Instead 
of the satisfaction of the patient, Nussbaum [16] emphasizes how important 
it is for the patient to have the opportunity to be active in the world even if 
the patient experiences some frustration. Fistein [45] also notes that people 
with an impaired capacity for autonomous agency would not be able to 
flourish in an environment where “all their wishes were respected,” since 
they are not always able to work out how to achieve a state of affairs that they 
could value or care about. Moreover, people are not always aware of the 
threats and risks associated with pursuing their goals. In cases where patients 
ask for help in reaching their religious, political, or ideological goals, the 
nursing staff must carefully consider whether to help or not. For example, 
in some cases they would have to take the need to protect the patient’s 
reputation and privacy into account, as well as what is good for others. These 
considerations were central in the case presented by Radden [46], where a 
hospitalized patient wanted to preach the Gospel to people around her 
and wanted help to do so: “Explaining this directive to me, she urged 
me to share her revelation with her elderly mother and her school-age 
daughters. I explained that I was reluctant to do so, and that whatever the 
truth of these messages, her loved ones would be bothered by them. She 
was distressed over my decision, seeing me as an agent of the devil for my 
failure to tell the world of her revelation—this was a message from God, 
she stressed, and not to be kept secret.” 
Even when patients are not helped to realize their wishes and goals, it is still 
crucial to know what they are. In these cases, the psychiatrist is still obliged, 
according to Radden and Sadler [25], to understand the source of the patient’s 
view, “the extent to which they rest not only on discoverable empirical 
realities but on deeply held moral and philosophical attitudes and beliefs,” 
and negotiate treatments by referring to the patient’s values and perspectives. 



































Fulford, Thornton, and Graham [36] point out that too often goals are 
misunderstood or are simply assumed without asking patients what they 
actually are. 
A challenge for communities 
In western societies in particular, work life gives people opportunities and 
influences their social roles in society. Taking this into account, states could, 
for example, promote opportunities for psychotic people to work part-time 
without, for example, the risk of losing their pensions or other economic 
benefits. Moreover, the state could promote a civil society where people’s 
opportunities and social roles would not tie so closely to their occupational 
status. Chan and Chiu [35] point out that policy-makers should endeavor 
to empower mental health service users as voters and as “survivors,” and in 
this way, help people to identify themselves as citizens. 
In addition, good library systems serve people who are not able to buy the 
books themselves, and that way, further their intellectual development. 
Moreover, there could be various free courses where it would be possible to 
develop one’s thinking, such as literature and writing courses and courses 
in philosophy, ethics, and art. Furthermore, the state could be obliged to 
provide extra support for education so that people with psychotic disorder 
have greater opportunities to develop intellectually. The state might also be 
legally obliged to support different kinds of social groups and networks where 
people with psychotic disorder could meet and discuss their ideas.8 Also, the 
service users’ involvement in research (especially in mental health research) is 
a way to promote their freedom of belief and opinion by giving opportunities 
to influence the way in which issues are discussed and challenge the users to 
develop their ways of thinking [47]. These sorts of activities could be partly 
provided by ideological or religious communities, or by other kinds of 
organizations in which case the state could support them. 
According to the WHO [5], religious authorities and other opinion-makers 
could also take part when the rights of people with mental disorder are 
discussed. Ideological and religious communities may recognize that people 
need to develop their capabilities. There may be people in these communities 
who give their time in order to understand individual situations. These 
communities may also give people something to do so that they are able to 
use their gifts. Moreover, communities’ active roles in promoting the freedom 
of belief and opinion might often go together with protecting the rights to 
mental health. According to Borras et al. [48], people with schizophrenia 
who considered religion important in their life and actively attended religious 
group activities were the most adherent group in psychiatric treatment. Non- 
adherent patients with schizophrenia were more often people who considered 
religion important but who were not actively involved in religious groups. 



































From the viewpoint of mental health and capabilities, it might be worth 
encouraging religious patients to be socially active in their religious groups. 
It might be that in most religious communities, a psychotic person’s religious 
views develop in a more healthy direction if he or she gets feedback and has 
somebody to talk with about religious issues.9 
Finally, it might be seen as a wider cultural and ethical challenge to encourage 
people with psychosis to participate and be more social with other members 
of society. People in general could act in relation to each other so that every 
citizen could enjoy freedom of belief and opinion, which might mean, for 
example, “a chance to get to know somebody better, a cue that you are welcome 
to participate in some activity, a suggestion that you make yourself known in 
some context or other where others may create social affordances for you,” 
as Grant Gillet [19] puts it while discussing the holistic nature of recovery 
where “nothing is incidental, and everything contributes to everything 
else, even something as minimal as becoming competent at walking the 
neighbour’s dog.” 
Discussion 
The consequences of psychotic disorder seem to be deep and holistic, and 
when it comes to freedom of belief and opinion, they concern both internal 
capabilities and external opportunities. In this article I have suggested that 
psychotic disorder may, on the one hand, weaken many believing and think-
ing capabilities, but on the other, also bring some meaningful abilities to the 
individual. Unbalanced power structures and nursing cultures, which ignore 
existential considerations, may weaken the person’s capabilities as well as 
add to stigmatization in communities. I also pointed out different possibilities 
for how the freedom of belief and opinion of people with psychotic disorder 
can be promoted. Arrangements in mental health facilities are needed for 
practicing religion and discussing politics, appropriate medication, helping 
in decision-making, individualistic care, and service user involvement to 
promote the freedom of belief and opinion in the treatment context. 
Promoting civil society and participation in societies and communities and 
co-working with religious and ideological communities may promote freedom 
of belief and opinion more widely in society. 
Whatever the reason for a person’s weak capabilities is, with psychotic dis-
order, from the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, it is a sign of injustice: 
society has not offered the individual with psychosis access to capabilities [13, 
16]. From the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, there is a collective duty 
to promote the thinking and believing capabilities of people with psychotic 
disorder [16]. 
However, as a point of view concerning human rights, the line between 
judical and ethical duties must be defined more precisely. Who and how 



































far are people judicially responsible for protecting the freedom of belief and 
opinion of individuals with psychosis? Especially when we consider the 
freedom of belief and opinion of people with psychotic disorder more broadly 
in communities and society, it is not clear in which sense it can be said that 
communities or the society as a whole have violated these rights and in which 
sense they are responsible for promoting them. For example, even though it 
seems that stigmatization reduces freedom of belief and opinion, in most cases 
it would be impossible to charge somebody with stigmatizing someone else. 
Since stigmatization is a complex process where almost everyone is involved 
in one way or another, it might be regarded as a social problem, which 
belongs to the area of ethics rather than a legal problem. However, from 
the viewpoint of the capabilities approach, the state might still have a legal 
obligation to somehow prevent stigmatization and promote capabilities. We 
might also ask whether the person with psychosis has certain duties when it 
comes to developing their internal capabilities. Is a patient with psychosis 
expected to be, in a certain sense, virtuous in order to possess his or her 
internal capabilities? (See Kuosmanen [24], p. 5, note 1; about being a 
virtuous patient in the context of psychotherapy, see Waring [50]). 
When the psychotic individual’s freedom of belief and opinion is discussed 
in terms of capability, the challenge seems to be that it is unclear what exactly 
should be protected by the law. It seems that capabilities are weakened 
because other people are suspicious, because mental health workers and 
others are not sufficiently virtuous, and so on. However, it is unclear how 
these problems could be solved by legislation. Even if there were legal 
solutions, the attitudes of those who follow the rules of law rather than what 
the law itself stipulates seem to be more crucial for psychotic individuals’ 
capabilities. The capabilities approach seems to have a challenge: psychotic 
people’s freedom of belief and opinion in terms of capability is very much 
an ethical question, which cannot be resolved by law. However, since freedom 
of belief and opinion is a legal right, it should be understood in such a way 
that it is possible for it to be protected by law. 
Thus, it seems that realizing interdisciplinary two-way interaction in 
human rights theory as has been done in this research leads us to deep 
challenges of human rights discussions concerning the relationships between 
judicial and ethical rights and duties. 
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Notes  
1. By “freedom of belief and opinion” I refer to the constellation of human rights that protect 
an individual’s thinking and believing, including freedom of religion, belief, conscience, 
opinion, and thought. 



































2. See, for example, the patient interviewed by Iso-Koivisto [23, p. 85], who suspected that her 
psychosis was influenced by a bad spiritual season. Another patient, also interviewed by 
Iso-Koivisto [23, p. 91], found that he started to hear voices after he had started praying 
for help for his emotional life.  
3. “Se nyt on semmonen, ettei niinku oo mitään, ei mistään nauti, eikä oo mitään semmosia 
elämisen haluja, sitä menee semmosena puuduttetuna paikasta toiseen. Eikä mitään lehtii 
pysty lukemaan, ei mihinkään keskittymään, jos luet niin et muista vähän ajan päästä 
yhtään mitään mistä luit.” Translated by the author.  
4. When the WHO [5] interprets MI Principles, it notes that facilities for religious practice are 
included in an environment that is “as close as possible to that of normal life.”.  
5. For example, Muslim patients do not eat pork. Some patients may also be convinced 
vegetarians, etc.  
6. Authors Widdershoven and Abma [42] seem to be open to something like that since they 
note that if it is necessary, “the care situation should be adjusted, for example when a 
patient does not want to be helped by a certain professional, but is open to another.” 
However, should the opportunity to choose one’s psychiatrist be open to all who seem 
capable of making such a choice?  
7. Nussbaum discusses this in the context of people with mental impairments.  
8. See Wagner and King [32], who note that some patients with psychotic disorder find it 
important to share their experiences and views in group therapy. They report that these 
patients’ understanding of their illness was developed in these groups; they were also better 
able to accept their illness, and even their self-esteem improved. However, some patients 
preferred to both find the information about mental disorders and reflect upon their lives 
by themselves.  
9. Borras et al. [48] noted that only 36% of patients with schizophrenia discussed spiritual 
issues with psychiatrists even though more than two thirds of them considered spirituality 
to be very important in everyday life. See also Teinonen [49], who argues that individual-
istic spirituality may be a health risk, because a person’s own fears and feelings of guilt 
often influence his or her image of God. According to Teinonen, people usually need others 
to help them create a healthy image of God.   
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